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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE, AND ITS THREE CONFLICTS
(21 OF NOVEMBER 2013, THROUGH 23 OF MAY 2014)*
Cristián Faundes**
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the results of a study of the 
crisis in Ukraine, guided by the following question: 
which is the intensity of the crisis in Ukraine between 
November 2013 and May 2014? The information 
collected for this research involves 293 events 
evaluated and translated into quantitative data by 
the author with the objective to elaborate a curve 
reflecting the intensity of the conflict. Considering that 
the situation under scrutiny involves several conflicts, 
one curve of intensity was not enough to follow the 
course of events, but three were needed to track the 
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facts that are intertwined by policies in, around and about Kiev, which reveals the 
particular complexity of the case of study. During the second phase, the internal 
conflict drags the other two, but the efforts to reduce the intensity of these are 
not effective to moderate the internal one. The method applied reveals its value 
as a flexible tool that allows the evaluation of a complex situation in a simple way, 
but also exposes the fact that none of the divergences is settled.
Keywords: Civil War; International Security; Ukraine.
UN ANÁLISIS DE LA CRISIS EN UCRANIA Y SUS TRES CONFLICTOS
 (21 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2013 A 23 DE MAYO DE 2014)
RESUMEN
Este artículo presenta los resultados de un estudio a partir de la siguiente pregunta 
de investigación: ¿cuál es la intensidad de la crisis en Ucrania entre noviembre 
2013 y mayo 2014? Se identifican 293 sucesos que son evaluados y traducidos a 
datos cuantitativos, con el objeto de elaborar una curva que refleje la intensidad 
del conflicto. Considerando que este caso involucra varias disputas, se ha hecho 
insuficiente generar una única curva de intensidad para graficar lo acontecido; 
en cambio, se necesitaron tres para hacer el seguimiento de los hechos, que se 
encuentran entrelazados por políticas formuladas al interior de Ucrania, algunas 
en torno al país y finalmente otras respecto del mismo. Ello revela la particular 
complejidad del caso en estudio. Durante la segunda fase de la crisis, la divergencia 
interna arrastra las otras dos, pero los esfuerzos por reducir su intensidad no son 
efectivos para moderar el problema interno. El método aplicado en el estudio 
destaca como una herramienta flexible que permite realizar la evaluación de una 
situación compleja en una forma simple, asimismo da cuenta que ninguna de las 
controversias se ha solucionado.
Palabras clave: Guerra Civil; Seguridad Internacional; Ucrania.
UMA ANALISE DA CRISE DA UCRÂNIA E SEUS TRÊS CONFLITOS (21 DE 
NOVEMBRO DE 2013 A 23 DE MAIO DE 2014)
RESUMO
Este artigo apresenta os resultados de um estudo sobre a crise na Ucrânia, guiada 
pela pergunta seguinte: qual é a intensidade da crise da Ucrânia entre novembro 
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de 2013 e maio 2014? As informações obtidas por esta pesquisa envolvem 293 
eventos, avaliados e traduzidos em dados quantitativos pelo autor, com o objetivo 
de elaborar um gráfico que reflete a intensidade do conflito. Considerando que 
a situação em apreço envolve vários conflitos, uma cifra de intensidade não foi 
o suficiente para seguir o curso dos acontecimentos, sendo necessárias mais três 
para acompanhar os fatos que estão interligados por políticas dentro, ao redor e 
sobre Kiev, o que revela a especial complexidade do caso em estudo. Durante 
a segunda fase da crise, o conflito interno arrasta os outros dois, mas os esforços 
para reduzir a sua intensidade não são eficazes para moderar o problema interno. 
O método usado no estudo constitui uma ferramenta flexível, que permite a 
avaliação de uma situação complexa de forma simples, também expõe o fato de 
que nenhuma das divergências é liquidada.
Palavras-chave: Guerra Civil; Segurança Internacional; Ucrânia.
Introduction
Authors from Sociology and the 
discipline of International Relations 
have been eager to establish a model 
to measure the intensity of conflicts. 
One of the key problems relates to 
the quantification of facts to translate 
a series of actions into a readable, 
consistent and logical curve on a graph 
to visualize the evolution of a conflict. 
Ministries and Departments of Foreign 
Affairs need these kind of tools as 
valuable instruments to diagnose the 
strategic landscape, whether they 
represent countries directly involved 
in a conflict, a State that has legitimate 
interests in it, or need to monitor the 
situation in an area of awareness. 
Conflicts are inherent to human 
interactions; they derive from the 
pursuit of incompatible interests 
(Martínez de Murguía, 1999: 17-18). 
If latent conflicts are not transformed 
promptly, the actors involved may 
trigger one or multiple crisis, provoking 
a perception of threat. The complexity 
to diagnose a crisis is obvious; in this 
context, the Curve of the Intensity 
of Conflict is a tool to simplify the 
process. The crisis in Ukraine is a 
special example of the difficulty to 
do a proper follow-up of events, 
particularly because it is impossible 
to track the facts concerning this crisis 
from a unique perspective, from one 
standpoint to build one and only curve. 
3 Some examples, the UCDP/PRIO Conflict Dataset; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s 
Conflict Barometer; Conflict Information System (CONIS) database; the Shock of Conflict SHoC Model, 
among others.
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This paper presents the results of a 
study of the crisis in Ukraine, with the 
aim to determine the intensity of the 
crisis in Ukraine, between November 
2013 and May 2014. The information 
collected for this research involves 
293 events that were evaluated and 
translated into quantitative data. One 
curve was not enough to follow the 
course of events; there is the need to 
draw three of them to track the facts that 
are intertwined by policies in, around 
and about Kiev. The method applied 
admits an orderly disaggregation 
of data that, in this particular case, 
enables a deeper understanding of a 
complex situation that involves several 
conflicts.  
Even though the term Crisis is fairly 
defined and understood, there is 
some difficulty determining when a 
crisis is actually happening. It is also 
particularly challenging to establish 
which is the starting point, and the end 
of it. In this context, it is debatable if 
after two years, Ukraine is still enduring 
a crisis or else. 
From another perspective, it is pertinent 
to analyze the case considering its 
particular characteristics. It is worthy 
of note the fact that this crisis begun 
as an internal political phenomena, 
that after three months attracts 
international actors. It escalates from 
the streets of Kiev to the offices of the 
Kremlin in Moscow, reaches NATO’s 
Central Command in Brussels and 
even expands its influence to the 
Oval Office at the White House in 
Washington, DC. The developments 
that take part in the crisis of Ukraine 
are the most critical in Europe after the 
end of the Cold War. Not because of 
the degree of violence, but somehow 
it evidences the underlying conflict 
between the West and Russia, up to a 
point in which the confidence building 
measures carefully designed to set up a 
partnership for security between NATO 
and Russia, suddenly faded away. The 
crisis in Ukraine marks the moment in 
which distrust stands between Moscow 
and Washington provoking the most 
significant moment of tension since the 
Cold War. Consequently, a renewed 
perception of threat activated worries 
about the use of intercontinental 
missiles and even nuclear weapons. 
Conflict, crisis and the curve of 
intensity.
Martínez de Murguía (1999) states 
that a conflict concerns a relationship 
between two or more organized 
groups, within a nation or between 
States that have incompatible interests; 
which induces them to confront each 
other while attempting to achieve their 
objective. However, Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff (1981) indicate that this 
kind of interaction implies more than a 
mere competition; they consider that 
in a dynamic of conflict, the adversaries 
seek to improve their own position 
reducing the one of the opponents. 
A conflict is particularly sensitive when 
it manifests as a crisis, once a key player 
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challenges an adversary. In a situation 
of crisis there is a perception of a threat 
to a nation, its territories, citizens, 
military forces, possessions, or vital 
interests, “that develops rapidly and 
creates a condition of such diplomatic, 
economic, or military importance that 
commitment of military forces and 
resources is contemplated to achieve 
national objectives” (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2010: 55). Then, during a crisis, 
the dialectic of the conflict accelerates, 
reducing the timeframe to respond. 
This means that decision makers 
need to gain the initiative, keep it, 
and maintain the liberty of action, 
meanwhile policy makers are under 
pressure to produce, in a very short 
period of time, an array of options 
for decision makers to asses. A proper 
diagnose of the situation is critical, 
particularly because, while willing to 
take control of the situation, a key 
player in the conflict would want to 
avoid raising the temperature… other 
might be interested on promoting an 
escalation. The diagnosis includes not 
only facts per se, but also the possible 
impacts that decisions, actions and 
declarations might produce, and 
finally the perceptions of the public 
opinion, of the adversary, and allies 
and partners. 
The curve of intensity of conflict is an 
instrument to measure the evolution 
of a conflict. According to Michael 
Lund (2009), it is built upon the 
understanding that conflicts have a 
basic life history, they evolve in stages, 
rises and falls in intensity over time, 
progressively towards war or peace. 
The result is a graphic representation 
of what is happening on terrain, 
so it helps to visualize the facts in 
perspective, particularly to understand 
their dynamic. An acute diagnostic 
of the situation serves to successfully 
manage a conflict and even identify 
key points to resolve it. More in detail, 
taking note of how sensitive a crisis 
is, the results derived from a curve of 
conflict might be even more valuable 
for decision makers.
To collect an appropriate amount of 
data to build a graph it is required 
an extensive review of news stories, 
reports, interviews and academic 
papers on the matter. To draw a proper 
curve it is necessary to examine every 
single day of the period under scrutiny, 
identify key events that determine 
the course of the relationship (or the 
dynamic) and pointing out coherently 
and consistently the value of every 
occurrence. Only then, it is possible to 
establish the ‘tone’ or the ‘level’ of the 
relationship.
The curve of intensity is more valuable 
as an instrument when it is used 
to measure events that are actually 
happening, for example while a crisis 
is under development. However, it can 
also give substantial feedback while 
analyzing a conflict on perspective. 
In the case of this research, it has 
been particularly useful to identify the 
interdependence of three conflicts 
that mingle in a crisis. Moreover, 
particularly, to observe that the study 
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of a crisis needs to be disaggregated to 
understand its complexity, especially 
according to the conflicts involved.
The curve integrates conceptual and 
interpretative elements. To translate 
the data in operational terms, every 
one of the 293 events identified 
in the study has been categorized 
conceptually under the following 
definitions: Difference, contradiction, 
polarization, violence, war, ceasefire, 
agreement, normalization and 
reconciliation. Once the occurrence 
is under one of these categories it 
is valued according to its level of 
intensity: “low”, “medium” or “high”.
Definitions
Difference: At this point of the 
relationship, there is an identification 
of initial differences. These are 
manifested in meetings and through 
the press, but always in the form of 
exchange of opinions and points of 
view. Dialogue and the search for 
agreements is predominant.
Contradiction: the dialogue among 
actors is less fluid because the 
contraposition of interests and values 
is deep, that is why it is difficult to 
reach for agreements. There are fewer 
exchanges of ideas and points of view, 
fewer meetings and encounters. On a 
higher level of contradiction, there are 
official discourses and declarations on 
the press disqualifying the adversary. 
There also might be mutual accusations 
around the impossibility to reach 
accords. Divergent positions echoes to 
the civil society.
Polarization: progressively the 
citizens get involved in the conflict. 
The antagonism reaches the streets 
with marches of support to one or 
the other side, there are signs of 
discrimination and intolerance. The 
press cites provoking and disqualifying 
opinions. On its highest level, the 
intolerance might be reflected in 
electoral propaganda with political 
leaders assuming positions towards a 
social identification with the conflict. 
Progressively opportunities for 
dialogue and the reach of agreements 
get narrowed. 
Violence: when measures of force take 
part in the conflict, on its higher levels 
an actor seeks to harm the counterpart. 
People might take the streets or iconic 
buildings, there are massive arrests 
and bloodshed. Events are classified 
as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ according 
to the expansion of violence, quantity 
of people involved in the incidents 
and amount of cities involved, also 
with regard to the quality or impact 
of the incidents concerning who was 
affected (a relevant person in office or 
a leader of protesters), and the degree 
of violence. In terms of military force, 
exercises and readiness could be 
considered as low level of violence. 
War: when there are direct actions 
of hostility, which involve the use of 
firearms or arm systems and operations 
REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 11 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre
Cristián Faundes
143
with at least a minimum level of 
operative and logistic capacity. In an 
act of war, the weaker adversary has 
the capacity to respond and react 
against an aggression, can even cause 
harm to the stronger part; it can hold 
its position and counts with enough 
support to sustain the fight4. 
Ceasefire: it is the result of a truce, so 
it is only possible to get to this point 
after a conflict had reached a level 
of war. Indicates that the parts have 
been able to reach a minimum level 
of convergence allowing the ceasefire. 
There could be isolated points of 
struggle. It has an equivalent level to 
violence because it is assumed that 
the motives that triggered the armed 
conflict are still latent. A successful 
ceasefire generates proper conditions 
for dialogue by the reduction of 
violence and the promotion of trust. 
Accord: this point is reached once there 
is a document signed by the parties 
involved. It is equivalent to the level 
of polarization due to the difficulties 
inherent to the implementation of any 
accord and especially related to the 
4 On the contrary, an act of aggression is considered as unilateral violence.
Table 1. Concepts, levels and values applied to the events
considered for the curve of conflict
Increasing intensity Decreasing intensity
Concept Level Value Level Concept
War
High 75 High
WarMiddle 70 Middle
Low 65 Low
Violence
High 60 High
CeasefireMiddle 55 Middle
Low 50 Low
Polarization
High 45 High
AccordMiddle 40 Middle
Low 35 Low
Contradiction
High 30 High
NormalizationMiddle 25 Middle
Low 20 Low
Difference
High 15 High
ReconciliationMiddle 10 Middle
Low 5 Low
Elaborated by the autor.
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development of mechanisms to lower 
the tension. 
 
There is suspiciousness between the 
parties and sometimes the will to 
yield is limited to the steps taken by 
the counterpart. In a successful level 
of accord, the parts involved search 
actively for solutions and involve the 
civil society in the processes. When 
the level of intensity of the conflict is 
still high, the players are incapable to 
engage with what is necessary to pacify 
the situation and solve the roots of the 
conflict, and so they might decide to 
appeal once again to the use of force.
Normalization: situation tends to 
stabilize around a point equivalent 
to “Contradiction”. The actors have 
the will to search for agreements with 
the object to avoid future strokes. 
The parts work mainly developing a 
structure to regulate and facilitate their 
interactions. 
Reconciliation: the conflict is resolved. 
The parties involved have no particular 
divergences that could affect their 
relationship.
The three curves of conflict in 
Ukraine during the 2013-2014 crisis.
This research covers developments 
from Nov 21, 2013 to the 23rd of May, 
2014. During the study 293 conflict 
events were identified, evaluated and 
translated to quantitative data. In this 
narrated analysis of the results, events 
are organized in three phases and 
according to their link to each of the 
conflicts identified: internal conflict, 
Ukraine-Russia and West-Russia. These 
stages are presented corresponding to 
an interpretative account of the events, 
according to the cycles observed.  
The crisis begins when former 
President of Ukraine, Viktor 
Fedorovych Yanukovych, discards 
signing an accord with the EU to 
deepen trade. This event indicates the 
existence of significant polarization 
within the country towards ideological 
and economic frameworks available 
in Europe, once a series of popular 
manifestations arise against the 
political decision. Upon these actions, 
other two conflicts arise at the end of 
February, between Ukraine and Russia, 
and Russia and the West. The three of 
them show their interdependency until 
the internal conflict in Ukraine derives 
into a situation of low-intensity war by 
May, 2014. 
Phase 1 - Internal crisis
(21 Nov- 23 Feb).
As a consequence of President 
Yanukovich’s resolution to back 
away from an agreement to further 
commerce with the EU, there began a 
series of popular manifestations in the 
main cities of the country opposing 
this political decision. Soon enough 
polarization translated into violence in 
the streets. The 21 of November marks 
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the starting point of a crisis in motion 
that expands throughout Ukraine. 
Low intensity violence begins by the 25 
of November. Very soon, the mass media 
compares the events with the Orange 
revolution. On the 26 of November 
the EU rejects Ukraine’s proposal to 
begin talks simultaneously with Russia, 
a consistent indicator of the existence 
of an underlying conflict between the 
West and Russia. By the end of the 
month, more than 100.000 people 
gather at Kiev’s main plaza rejecting 
President Yanukovich’s decision. 
Since the 1st of December protesters 
ask for the President’s resignation. 
Police responds hardly and violence 
on the streets call the attention of the 
international community. Incidents of 
particular violence take place on the 
30th of November (2013), 19 and 
26 of January and 18, 19 and 20 of 
February, these dates mark the highest 
points in the curve during this phase 
of the crisis. It is relevant to recall that 
during the incidents in February, 39 
police officers are accused of shooting 
unarmed protesters, infuriating the 
citizens against the government. 
However, later reports indicate police 
officers were also targets. Ex-Ukrainian 
Interior Minister, Vitaly Zakharchenko, 
declared to RT (“100% sure,” 2014) 
that during these days, 86 officers were 
shot at, 14 of them died, and none of 
the officers deployed were carrying 
their service weapons. From another 
perspective it is relevant to note that 
the violence and the Ukrainian winter 
frost was unable to dissolve the will 
of the protesters on the streets, in 
this sense calls the attention the fact 
that they stood up for so many days 
in the cold. This fact indicate that the 
issues at stake were of high value, this 
is the political and economic changes 
related to the new terms of association 
with the EU. 
The lowest point of intensity during 
this phase came on 14 February with 
the liberation of 234 protesters under 
arrest since December, protesters 
respond returning public buildings 
back to authorities. 23 of February 
marks another low intensity point, 
when parliamentarians agree to name 
Olexander Turchynov as interim 
President of the country, one day 
after President Yanukovich had been 
removed from office by the Ukrainian 
Parliament. The agreement reached 
on 21 of February has merely a 
symbolic value, signed one day before 
Yanukovich’s ousting. However, 
it is relevant to highlight its fourth 
paragraph: “Investigation into recent 
acts of violence will be conducted 
under joint monitoring from the 
authorities, the opposition and the 
Council of Europe” (Agreement on 
the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine. 
21 February 2014). However, a public 
report consigned that, “Violations by 
police, including torture and other ill-
treatment as well as abusive use of force 
during demonstrations, continued 
with near-total impunity for the 
perpetrators, while investigations into 
such incidents remained ineffective” 
(Amnesty International, 2015).
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Phase 2 - External conflicts arise, the 
curve diverges in three
(25 Feb – 3 Apr).
In the second phase of the crisis 
the external conflicts arise with 
divergent intensities, reason enough 
to analyze the crisis in Ukraine with 
a disaggregating perspective, focusing 
separately into each of the conflicts 
involved. The crisis of political visions in 
Ukraine activates other two underlying 
conflicts, between Kiev and Moscow, 
and the West and Russia. 
Internal
The 22 of February, when President 
Yanukovich is removed from office, 
people in the cities of Bila Tserkva, 
Khmelnitsky and Zhytomyr bring down 
statues of Lenin. The next day pro-
Russians stand to protect the statue of 
the Russian communist revolutionary in 
Kharkiv. Even after the replacement of 
the former president there is still unrest, 
particularly in the Russian-speaking 
regions of the country where there is 
opposition to the new administration 
in Kiev. On the 25th of February, BBC 
News (“Ukraine crisis,” 2014) reports 
that interim President Turchynov 
warns of the dangers of separatism. 
The situation worsens through the first 
days of March, by the 9th, activists have 
taken the streets of the main cities 
along the country where clashes have 
taken place between pro-Russians 
and pro-Ukrainians. Two days later, 
Kiev have asked the OSCE to bring 
observers to the South and East of 
the country. The government calls for 
alternative ways to solve the crisis while 
asking the population not to support 
unconstitutional activities. Among these 
events of heightened polarization and 
low levels of violence of the internal 
conflict in Ukraine, a different kind of 
situation begins to unfold in Crimea 
initiating a second curve.
The second curve with Russia and 
Ukraine. 
On the 26 of February clashes between 
pro-Russians and anti-Russians, take 
place on the streets of Simferopol. 
Up to this point the events in Crimea 
might be taken as part of the situation 
of instability taking place in the country 
as a whole. The next day a pro-Russian 
command expels the local government 
of Crimea and takes control of the 
capital’s parliament where they vote 
to approve a referendum to ask for 
more autonomy for the region. Men 
on black uniforms with no flags or 
banners occupy other key buildings. 
These unidentified actors impulse 
the second phase of the crisis with 
the manifestation of another conflict, 
the one between Russia and Ukraine, 
which involves different interests. 
At this point it is very important 
to make clear that Russia denied 
its involvement in the process that 
derived to the annexation of Crimea, 
in fact the first comments on the 
issue by the President of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Putin, were on 
the 4th of March, denying the presence 
of Russian troops in the peninsula. But 
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one month later he stated on a live TV 
program that Russian units had been 
involved in wresting Crimea from Kiev’s 
control, explaining that they had to 
take unavoidable steps, “so that events 
did not develop as they are currently 
developing in southeast Ukraine” (as 
cited in Anischchuk, 2014). He stated 
that the annexation was partly triggered 
by NATO expansion, explaining that:
If Nato goes there, Russia will be 
pushed out from the area around 
the Black Sea. This is pushing out 
Russia from this important part 
of the world. Let’s not be afraid 
of anything, but we should take 
that into account, and respond 
accordingly. (as cited in Gentleman, 
2014)
On this phase, the intensity of the 
crisis oscillates between high levels of 
violence, to low levels of polarization. 
On the 28 of February armed men 
take the airports of Belbek and 
Simferopol; only then, Kiev accuses 
Moscow of exerting an armed invasion 
and occupation. The next day, the 
Federation Council, approves a military 
intervention in Ukraine, invoking the 
right to protect its interests and the 
Russian speaking population. This 
event activates the state of alert of the 
military forces in Ukraine and stands 
as a warning sign to the West (see 
below A Third Curve arises following 
Russia and the West). Reiteratively the 
government of Ukraine accuses Russian 
intervention, even Prime Minister 
Yatsenyuk stipulates that Moscow has 
declared war (2nd of March). Military 
readiness and high levels of political 
accusations situates the intensity of 
the crisis at different levels of violence. 
As Western powers begin talks with 
Russia to lower the temperature of the 
crisis, Ukraine accelerates the pace of 
its diplomacy to gain support for its 
cause. On the 6 of March, the Crimean 
Parliament decides the annexation of 
the peninsula to Russia and calls for 
a referendum for the citizens to vote. 
This same day, Russia sinks one of its 
own ships in a strategic area of the 
Black Sea to block the exit of Ukrainian 
vessels from the Crimean peninsula. 
The next day, the Russian government 
declares it will back up Crimea if the 
region votes favoring the secession 
of Ukraine. Meanwhile, by the 9th of 
March, there are clashes between pro-
Russian and anti-Russian factions in the 
streets of the main cities in Ukraine and 
the country’s Prime Minister, Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk asks the people not to cede 
a single centimeter to Russia. Between 
the 7 and 17 of March, the intensity of 
the crisis keeps a level of polarization. 
Nevertheless, the referendum that 
takes place in Crimea on the 16th would 
change things forever.
Official data informed that more than 
82% of the population of Crimea 
participated on the referendum, 
from which more than 96% voted 
in favor to the annexation to Russia. 
This will becomes a fact on the 18th of 
March when President Putin signs the 
documents changing the flag of the 
Crimean peninsula, situating the curve 
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at a high level of violence. This is the 
latest peak of the curve analyzed during 
the period under scrutiny, since then, 
the intensity of the conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine oscillates between 
a low level of violence and mid-level of 
polarization, as it will be described later.
Ukraine’s immediate response to 
the loss of territory is leaving the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States (under the lead of Moscow) on 
the 19th of March. Two days later, the 
government signs the political chapters 
of an agreement of association with 
the EU and participates in military 
exercises with NATO in Bulgaria (for 
two weeks, until the 4th of April). On 
the 30th, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation, Sergey 
Lavrov, suggests that the federalization 
of Ukraine is the only way to settle 
down its political crisis. The 3rd of 
April, military exercises take place in 
the Russian region of Volgograd, close 
to the border with Ukraine. A few 
days later, when the internal conflict 
of Ukraine revamps with separatist 
movements taking control of public 
buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk on 
the 6th of April, some sources speak of 
a ‘second wave’ of a special operation 
held by the Russian Federation against 
Ukraine. These events give way to the 
third phase of the crisis.
A third curve arises following Russia 
and the West. 
There is still more to elaborate on 
the second phase, particularly on 
the relationship between Russia and 
the West. On the first day of March, 
President Obama asks President Putin 
to withdraw Russian forces back to 
their military bases; this indicates 
the beginning of the second part of 
the second phase of the crisis: when 
a third conflict unfolds. This one is a 
reaction to the successes of Russia 
imposing its interests over the conflict 
between Moscow and Kiev. It takes 
the form of a defense of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity 
alleging the illegality of the referendum 
to vote for the secession of Crimea and 
later the annexation of the peninsula 
by Moscow, but it is the interest to put 
a stop to Russian influence in Eastern 
Europe. Other actors get involved as 
well, such as NATO, Canada, Poland, 
OSCE, UN, EU, Switzerland and 
France. This crisis maintains a relatively 
low intensity in a state of polarization, 
until the first days of April, when 
it reaches a low level of violence, 
particularly because of accusations 
and preparations that indicate military 
readiness.
On the 3rd of March, the Pentagon 
announces that the US suspends every 
military ties between Washington 
and Moscow as a consequence of 
the Russian intervention in Crimea. 
Two days later, NATO suspends the 
participation of Russia in what was 
going to become their first joint 
mission; suspends every meeting 
between military and civilian officers 
from Russia; and submits to review 
every aspect of cooperation between 
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NATO and Russia. Only political 
dialogue is open to Ambassador level 
officers. The following day, Canada 
expels 9 Russian military officers 
from the country who were invited 
as part of a professional exchange 
program, also suspends every bilateral 
link with its armed forces including 
already planned meetings and military 
exercises. This same day a European 
Emergency Council condemns the 
violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
its territorial integrity. By the 8th, OSCE 
monitors receive warning shots for their 
attempt to visit the Crimean peninsula. 
On the 11th, Didier Burkhalter, leader 
of the OSCE and Switzerland’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, declares 
that the referendum in Crimea is 
illegal. On the 15th, Moscow vetoes a 
UN resolution draft that criticized the 
referendum about Crimea’s secession. 
The next day, voters approve the 
annexation to Russia, while the EU 
declares it will not recognize the 
results because it considered it illegal 
and illegitimate. The following day 
NATO states that the referendum is 
illegal and illegitimate as well. On 
the 17th, the US imposes economic 
restrictions to a Russian bank and 11 
Russian citizens close to President 
Putin (who allegedly had participated 
in Crimea’s annexation). The next 
day, NATO condemns Russia’s actions 
incorporating Crimea, while NATO 
and the US highlight the importance to 
develop a joint international response 
to the continuous violation of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Two 
days later, the EU would also condemn 
Russia for Crimea’s annexation, and the 
following day sanctions Russian and 
Ukrainian citizens that participated in 
the process.
On the 21st, NATO’s Secretary 
General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
considers the crisis in Ukraine as a 
geopolitical game changer, for which 
he settles three priorities for the allies 
to face Russia’s military aggression 
against Ukraine. 1. To reaffirm Allied 
commitment to collective defense. 2. 
Strengthen support to Ukraine and the 
wider region. 3. “And to make clear 
that we can no longer do business as 
usual with Russia” (Rasmussen, 2014).
On the 24th, Russia sanctions 13 
Canadian government officials 
as a reprisal for similar measures 
implemented by that country. On the 
27th, UN’s General Assembly approves 
a resolution stating that Crimea’s 
referendum is illegal. The following day 
press reports indicate an increase of 
NATO military planes in Baltic States. 
The next day, NATO’s commander 
anticipates his return to Europe from 
the US after non-confirmed versions 
of movement of Russian troops along 
the border with Ukraine. During the 
first day of April, after indicating no 
signs of a Russian troop retreat, NATO 
announces the suspension of every 
type of military and civilian cooperation 
with Russia, and asks Generals and 
Admirals of the Alliance to propose 
ideas for the defense of members in 
Eastern Europe. The following day, 
Jane’s publishes satellite photos, which 
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indicate an increase of Russian troops 
in Belgorod (located 40 km from 
Ukrainian border), authorized sources 
estimate the presence of 40 thousand 
troops. The next day, Russia begins 
military exercises in the Volgograd area 
(385 km from Luhansk, Ukraine).
After NATO suspended relations with 
Russia on April 1st, Russia calls its 
Ambassador to the entity, indicating 
it has deliberately heightened the 
tension. The 4th day of the month 
NATO’s deputy Secretary General, 
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, 
declares that Europe’s strategic 
environment has changed: “for 20 
years, the security of the Euro-Atlantic 
region has been based on the premise 
that we do not face an adversary to 
our East. This premise is now in doubt” 
(Vershbow, 2014). 
Phase 3 - Separatism spreads on 
Eastern Ukraine
(6 Apr - 23 May).
While the Crimean issue is handled by 
Russia as a fait accompli, the internal 
conflict in Ukraine revamps with the 
spread of separatism, particularly in 
the Eastern regions of the country. 
As it was anticipated in this text, the 
separatist movement that take part 
in Ukraine starting on the 6th of April 
is perceived as a ‘second wave’ of 
Russian activity against Kiev. While 
Ukraine and the West accuse Russia’s 
involvement in the confrontation, 
Moscow denies its participation and 
indicates that the crisis in Ukraine “is 
to be blamed on those who organized 
the state coup in Kiev” (as cited in 
“Kiev says,” 2014). Although Moscow 
has denied its involvement with the 
separatists movements that emerge 
after the Crimean issue, it’s eventual 
or possible participation in the conflict 
is still a debated issue, but there is 
not enough evidence to directly or 
strongly accuse Moscow. From a realist 
perspective, Eastern Ukraine is an area 
of Russian geopolitical interest, where 
it has significant influence. The West 
and Ukraine understand that Russia 
has to be part of a solution. Therefore, 
accusations against Moscow gradually 
mutate to an active interest to involve 
the Kremlin in the search for solutions 
to the conflict. It has been necessary 
to take note of these facts while 
collecting the data for the research, as 
a consequence, the events related to 
the internal conflict have been isolated 
from the conflict between Ukraine 
and Russia, as well as from the one 
between the West and Russia.
Spread of separatism in the internal 
front. 
Until the first days of May, the level 
of intensity of the internal conflict 
oscillates between high levels of 
violence to a mid-level of polarization, 
taking note that there are many 
consecutive high points by the end of 
April.
On the 6th of April separatist groups 
take control of public buildings of 
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cities in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv. 
The next day, pro-Russians announce 
the formation of the Republic of 
Donetsk, calls for a referendum to be 
held on the 11th of May, to ask for the 
annexation to Russia and calls Moscow 
to send peacekeepers to warrant the 
feasibility of the process, but none of 
these occurred. On that same day, the 
acting President of Ukraine, Oleksandr 
Turchynov announces prohibition 
to perform separatist activities in the 
country. The following day security 
forces from Kiev begin an antiterrorist 
operation in Kharkiv. On the 10th of 
April, the self-proclaimed Republic of 
Donetsk decides to create a People’s 
Army. There are clashes in the streets 
of Odessa on the 11th and violence 
spreads along the Donbass (which 
includes the regions of Donetsk and 
Luhansk). On the 12th a security council 
takes place with the President in Kiev, 
the next day an antiriot operation takes 
place in Sloviansk and activists clash in 
Kharkov. By the 14th there are clashes 
in 9 cities of the Donetsk region and 
the city of Sloviansk refuses to transfer 
taxes to Kiev. That same day, acting 
President Turchynov signs a decree 
authorizing a special operation in the 
East of Ukraine, which begins the 15th 
in Donetsk with quite an unexpected 
result: pro-Russian citizens capture 
about one hundred soldiers and a 
dozen vehicles.
On the 17th of April the Geneva 
Accord was signed by representatives 
from Russia, EU and Ukraine to 
lower tensions in the East. Despite 
the agreement, violence continues; 
separatists did not participate on the 
arrangements so they do not comply 
returning public buildings nor with the 
disarmament. By the 22nd separatists 
are still active in at least 10 cities and 
towns occupying public buildings. By 
the 24th there are more than a dozen. 
On the 25th rebels take hostage eight 
European military observers (one is 
liberated three days later, the rest by 
the 3rd of May). On the 28th there is an 
assassination attempt against the mayor 
of Kharkiv. The next day hundreds of 
separatists occupy public buildings in 
Luhansk and take control of the city. 
There are at least 40 pro-Russians 
dead in street clashes in Odessa on the 
2nd of May, most of them were burnt 
alive or suffocated to death in the 
local House of Trade Unions, “many of 
those who managed to escape the fire 
were then brutally beaten by armed 
men” (“Odessa slaughter,” 2014)5. 
Struggles continue at least until the 4th. 
On 2 May, a military operation takes 
5 The Council of Europe declared on November 2015 that the official probes into the violent events in 
Odessa failed to comply with the requirements of the European Human Rights Convention, and reported 
that there was no substantial progress investigating the events. More in: Council of Europe Blasts Ukraine’s 
Investigations into Odesa Violence (2015, November 4). Radio Free Europe. Radio Liberty. Retrieved from: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-odesa-fire-council-europe-report/27345601.html 
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place in Kramatorsk; there are fierce 
combats against separatists in an effort 
to recover Slavyansk (in the region of 
Donetsk). For the first time during the 
crisis under scrutiny, a conflict reaches 
the level of war. Fighting continues at 
least through the 6th, according to The 
Guardian (“Ukraine is close,” 2014) 
this day the German foreign minister 
declares that Ukraine is a few steps 
away from a military confrontation. 
Afterwards, the situation recedes to 
a high level of violence. On the 7th 
the minister of defense of the self-
proclaimed Republic of Donetsk is 
under arrest, this day there is also a 
prisoner exchange between Ukraine’s 
security forces and Donetsk’s auto 
defense. By the 8th Ukraine confirms 
it will continue with the military 
operation in the East. On the 11th 
referendums about the autonomy 
of provinces are held in Luhansk 
and Donetsk, the following day the 
Popular Republic of Donetsk formally 
requests the annexation to the Russian 
Federation. Struggles continue as 
the EU and Ukraine rejects the 
referendum, while Russia respects 
its result. On the 17th the intensity 
reaches a mid-level of violence when 
there is a roundtable on national 
unity in Kharkiv among separatist’s 
occupations. However, this was only 
a parenthesis, because by the 22nd the 
conflict increases its intensity again 
reaching a low level of war, which is 
maintained the following days. By the 
23rd, President Putin believes Ukraine 
had descended into full-scale civil war, 
but denied that Moscow was behind 
acts involving pro-Russia separatists (as 
cited in “Russia’s Vladimir,” 2014).  
Ukraine - Russia. 
The conflict between Ukraine and 
Russia is definitely deescalating in this 
phase, from a low level of violence 
to a mid-level of polarization. Amid 
accusations from Ukraine on the 
alleged participation of Russia in the 
Eastern separatist movement, Moscow 
states that if it is attacked it will have to 
respond. In this regard, foreign minister 
Lavrov declares, “We will keep doing 
everything possible to consecutively 
protect the interests of Russian 
diasporas both in Ukraine and in other 
states” (as cited in Pochuev, 2014). 
Accordingly, Russia and later Ukraine 
deploy forces close to the frontier, 
heightening tensions. From another 
perspective, while Russia declares its 
conformity with the Geneva Accords, 
accuses Kiev of violating it (on 21st 
of April) and states on the 24th that 
Ukrainian authorities commit a crime 
if they use the army against their 
own people in the East. On the other 
hand, that same day Ukraine’s acting 
President, Oleksander Turchynov, said 
in a national address that “Russia is 
supporting terrorism in our country” (as 
cited in Vasovic & Anishchuk, 2014). 
On the 23rd, Russia begins military drills 
near the border with Ukraine, Russian 
Federation, Defense Minister, Sergei 
Shoigu, declared it was on response 
to “Ukraine’s military machine” and 
NATO exercises in Eastern Europe (as 
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cited in Vasovic & Anishchuk, 2014). 
By the 30th, armed forces in Ukraine 
are in full military readiness. On the 
7th of May, President Putin calls Kiev 
to stop the security operation held 
in the East. The next day Ukraine’s 
government declares they have 
deployed 15.000 troops by the border 
with Russia. On the 11th Moscow 
opens a voting station for Ukrainians, 
the next day an official statement 
delivered from the Russian president’s 
press service tensions the relationship 
once again because of an alleged 
interference in Ukraine’s internal 
matters by supporting the regions’ 
autonomy process:
Moscow respects the expression 
of will of the population of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions and 
proceeds on the basis that the 
implementation of the results of the 
referendums will be carried out in a 
civilised way, without any relapse of 
violence, through dialogue between 
representatives of Kiev, Donetsk and 
Luhansk. (“Moscow respects,” 2014)
On the 19th, the Kremlin criticizes 
Ukraine’s military campaign in the 
Southeast as well as the process for a 
constitutional reform because of an 
alleged lack of transparency. Two days 
later, Russia initiates the retreat of 
military forces from Rostov, Belgorod 
and Bryansk to their permanent bases. 
On the 23rd Kiev welcomes President 
Putin’s statement that the Kremlin will 
cooperate with authorities elected in 
the Ukrainian polls (held on the 25th). 
The West and Russia. 
The tension between the West and 
Russia tends to lower initially along 
this phase reaching a mid to low 
level of polarization, from the 8th of 
April through the 22nd. Afterwards, 
the intensity of the conflict heightens, 
oscillating from a mid-level of 
polarization to a low level of violence, 
until the 19th of May. By the end of the 
period studied the relationship reaches 
a low level of polarization with events 
occurred the 21st. 
In general terms polarization builds 
upon the involvement in the situation 
in Ukraine, while NATO’s Secretary 
General warns Russia not to interfere 
in Ukraine’s internal affairs (8 of April), 
President Obama asks President 
Putin to end support to pro-Russian 
separatists (14 of April) and President 
Putin urges President Obama to 
prevent a bloodshed in the country 
(15 of April). On the 18th both parties 
reach a mid-level of agreement with 
the Geneva Accords, but the Kremlin 
makes very clear it will not accept 
further sanctions against Russia. 
On the 21st, US Vice President Joe 
Biden personally brings to Kiev a new 
package of nonlethal aid (including 
medical supplies and helmets). The 
next day, he declares that Russia 
should stop supporting “men hiding 
behind masks” (as cited in Smith, 
2014_a). Russian Prime Minister, 
Dmitry Medvedev, replies stating that 
Russia is “ready for unfriendly steps” (as 
cited in Smith, 2014_b). On the 23rd, 
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US troops arrive to Eastern Europe 
initiating a rotatory presence in the 
region to perform training exercises in 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia; 
Dutch fighters intercept two Russian 
bombardiers in its airspace; and 
Russian military units initiate drills by 
the border with Ukraine. As previously 
noted, the later were triggered as a 
response to Ukraine’s deployment 
and NATO’s exercises in Europe. On 
the 24th, President Obama, Prime 
Minister Cameron, Chancellor Merkel, 
President Hollande, and Prime Minister 
Renzi decide to impose new sanctions 
against Russia; the US and EU impose 
sanctions on the 28th, but these are of 
such kind that on the 29th the stock 
market in Moscow responds raising 
its value. President Putin “responded 
by threatening to reconsider Western 
participation in energy deals” in the 
country (as cited in Tribune wire 
reports, 2014). On the 29th Canada 
imposes sanctions as well, and US 
Secretary of State, John Kerry, declares 
that “Today, Russia seeks to change 
the security landscape of eastern and 
central Europe”, adding that whatever 
path Russia chooses, “the United 
States and our allies will stand together 
in our defense of Ukraine” (as cited in 
Tribune wire reports, 2014). 
On the 8th of May, Russia activates 
a nationwide military exercise 
simulating a nuclear attack. Leaders 
of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization observed the drills 
with President Putin, it included the 
launching of intercontinental missiles 
from the Northeastern territories and 
from two nuclear submarines from the 
Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet. 
On the 19th, Moscow calls for a Russia-
NATO Council session about the 
sharp deterioration of the situation in 
Ukraine (a week later there was still no 
date for the summit). The 21st Russia 
initiates the retreat of military forces 
from Rostov, Belgorod and Bryansk to 
their permanent bases.
Conclusions
To measure the intensity of the crisis 
in Ukraine it was necessary to observe 
separately each one of the interacting 
conflicts: the internal one, another 
between Ukraine and Russia, and the 
other with Moscow and the West. The 
timeframe for the study was determined 
upon the crisis of the internal conflict, 21 
of November 2013 through 23 of May 
2014, until the appearance of strong 
signs that the situation was becoming 
a war. In this regard, 293 conflict 
events were identified, evaluated and 
translated to quantitative data. The 
result of the study is synthesized in the 
“Curve of Conflict Intensity in Ukraine” 
shown in Graphic 1. 
Phase 1 of the crisis (21 Nov. - 23 
Feb.) is almost exclusively an internal 
issue, except for three events that 
indicate the existence and interaction 
of the other two conflicts with this 
one. The association agreement with 
the EU and the impossibility of Kiev 
to negotiate in parallel with Moscow 
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forces Ukrainians to a dilemma, they 
are obliged to choose, so differences 
emerge. As choosing between one 
model or the other is a matter of 
vital interest, a greater part of the 
population is not apathetic to what 
is happening on the streets. On the 
other hand, the government loses 
legitimacy upon the violence exerted 
while facing the protests. During this 
stage, the crisis unfolds mainly at a 
low level of violence. It is relevant to 
observe that in this part of the curve, 
three out of six events that happen at a 
high level of violence occur in a period 
of three months. The other situations 
take place in a period of three days, 
until institutional instruments allow 
the Parliament to solve the crisis of 
legitimacy of the government by 
assigning an interim President, rapidly 
lowering down the tension.
The interaction of the three conflicts 
in Phase 2 (27 Feb. - 6 Apr.) create a 
confusing meddle of events that are 
impossible to analyze in one only 
curve, this is why the author of this 
study proposes to disaggregate the 
events to analyze the crisis in three 
conflicts. Because of this decision, the 
graphic splits into three different lines 
that reveal that the three conflicts have 
different manifestations during the 
crisis, with differing intensities. It is 
worthy of note that during the analysis 
of the events in this phase the method 
applied reveals its value as a flexible 
tool that allows the evaluation of a 
complex situation in a simple way.
The situation involving Russia and 
Ukraine has to do with the opposing 
interests of Moscow to have a 
sovereign access to the Black Sea and 
avoid Europe’s expansion, and Kiev’s 
will to protect the country’s territorial 
integrity. The conflict manifests at the 
highest level of violence, particularly 
during the last days of February, the first 
days of March and at the middle of this 
month, consigning the act of aggression 
performed by Moscow to annex 
Ukrainian territory. It has to be noted 
though that the annexation of Crimea 
happened in less than twenty days 
avoiding the use of military force and 
triggering internal drivers that brought 
legitimacy to the process. Crimea’s 
annexation is also characterized by its 
speed; Moscow outmaneuvered Kiev, 
giving no time to oppose a proper 
response, not even with the help of the 
international community. The Kremlin 
acted undercover, giving support to 
the local population, working with it, 
in such a way that it seemed like the 
citizenry had effectively moved the 
pieces of the chess table. The element 
of surprise was key to avoid reaching 
a level of war. Once the Crimean 
peninsula issue is presented as a fait 
accompli by the Kremlin, tension tends 
to lower down, abruptly after the 18th 
of March to a low level of violence until 
the first days of April, and gradually 
downwards to a high and mid-level of 
polarization during the third phase. 
 
The West-Russia conflict appears 
as a reaction to Russian maneuvers 
in Ukraine, as the West intends to 
broaden its model of influence in 
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Eastern Europe, Russia seeks to protect 
its area of influence. The tension 
heightens as Moscow succeeds making 
its interests prevail during Phase 2. 
Most events happen at a high level of 
polarization particularly after President 
Putin signs the document annexing 
Crimea, and some even stretch to 
higher intensity reaching a low level 
of violence by the first days of April. It 
might have been too risky for the West 
to heighten the tension at that point; 
Russia was responding accordingly 
to the challenges and had a clear 
determination of not turning back. This 
did not mean the West was going to 
accept Russia’s decision so the tension 
oscillates during the third phase among 
the different levels of polarization and 
even low levels of violence. 
The internal conflict resumes in Phase 
2 as well, in parallel to the events 
in Crimea, but with an oscillating 
intensity. There is an interesting 
continuum during the first days of 
March at a mid-level of violence, but 
somehow it defuses after a high peak 
on the 9th. Later the conflict revamps 
on Phase 3, at a mid-level of violence, 
a direct consequence of the events 
that happened earlier in Crimea, as the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict unfolds with the 
annexation of the peninsula. On Phase 
3, internal secessionist movements 
find an opportunity to mobilize 
the population towards achieving 
independence and the temperature of 
the conflict rises as separatists challenge 
the central government. During the 
last stage of events under scrutiny, the 
Geneva agreement generates reserved 
optimism among the State actors 
involved but not the separatists, who 
were not involved in the negotiations. 
Therefore, the truce extends for less 
than three days. 
Complex situations, such as the crisis in 
Ukraine challenge models of analysis, 
but also pushes researchers to pursue 
flexible applications of theory with 
the aim to produce better and more 
accurate findings. The theoretical 
framework used in this research was 
originally conceived as a tool to measure 
a single conflict, but the results in this 
paper open the door to use multiple 
curves of intensity to better understand 
multifaceted struggles. Now there is a 
clear understanding that in the case 
of Ukraine there are three interrelated 
conflicts. Regarding the circumstances 
on terrain, the most relevant conclusion 
is that none of the three conflicts is 
solved, their persistence should only 
become a warning sign about the 
situation in Eastern Europe, particularly 
taking note that the Strategic landscape 
in the region has critically changed. 
There is an urgent need to tackle these 
divergences to avoid further tensions 
in the future, which might increase the 
damage of the relations. The academia 
might be able to produce valuable 
inputs to help solve differences without 
strains; it all depends on formulating 
the proper questions.
Returning to the facts, by the end of 
November 2015, the threat presented 
by ISIS has pushed the West and Russia 
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to work together, and this venture 
might work even though there are 
still latent conflicts that bind them in 
Eastern Europe.
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